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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROSENN, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal presents an important question pertaining to 
the meaning of the term "occurrence" as used in a liability 
insurance policy. Specifically, it raises the issue whether a 
plaintiff's bodily injury or death, directly caused by the 
intentional act of a third party but also attributable to the 
negligence of the policyholder-insured, constitutes an 
"occurrence," and thus obligates an insurer to defend, and 
potentially indemnify, its insured for the insured's alleged 
negligence. The insurer in this case, Nationwide Mutual 
Fire Insurance Company of Columbus, Ohio (Nationwide), 
filed a declaratory judgment action in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
seeking a declaration that because an intentional act of a 
third party caused the plaintiff's death, there was no 
accident or "occurrence" and thus Nationwide has no duty 
to defend and indemnify its insured. The district court 
granted summary judgment for the insurance company. 
The insured appealed. We reverse. 
 
I. 
 
The facts pertaining to this appeal are uncomplicated 
and, for the most part, undisputed. The insured, Linda 
 
                                2 
  
Pipher (Pipher), is the owner of a multi-unit dwelling 
located in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, previously owned by 
her parents, Ernest and Rose Schafer. Prior to December 
1994, the Schafers and/or Pipher removed the doors to the 
second floor apartment of the property in order to install 
new carpeting. These doors were never reinstalled. At all 
relevant times, Nationwide insured Pipher's property under 
a "Tenant's Policy." 
 
In December 1994, Pipher leased the second floor 
apartment to Francis McFadden and his wife, Bernine. On 
February 3, 1995, Ian S. Wood, whom Pipher hired to paint 
the apartment, killed Bernine McFadden while she occupied 
the second floor apartment. As a result of Bernine 
McFadden's death, her husband, Francis, filed a state 
survival action for wrongful death against Pipher, Wood, the 
Schafers, and others in Philadelphia Court of Common 
Pleas. McFadden v. Pipher, No. 865, May Term 1996. 
Nationwide undertook Pipher's defense subject to a 
reservation of rights. 
 
Nationwide then filed a declaratory judgment action in 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania. Nationwide sought a declaration that it has 
no duty to defend and indemnify Pipher because Bernine 
McFadden's death was caused by an intentional assault 
and murder committed by Wood, and thus her death was 
not an insured "occurrence" as defined in the policy. 
Because there was no factual dispute, Nationwidefiled a 
motion for summary judgment. The district court granted 
Nationwide's motion, thereby relieving Nationwide of its 
duty to defend and potentially indemnify Pipher. Pipher 
timely appealed.1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The district court had diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 1332, as the parties are citizens of different states and the amount in 
controversy exceeded the then applicable amount of $50,000. This Court 
has appellate jurisdiction of the district court'sfinal order pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. S1291. 
 
It is undisputed that Pennsylvania law applies. The district court 
applied Pennsylvania law, as do we. 
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II. 
 
This appeal presents solely a legal issue. Thus, this 
court's review of the district court's grant of summary 
judgment is plenary. See Robertson v. Central Jersey Bank 
& Trust Co., 47 F.3d 1268, 1273 (3d Cir. 1995); see also 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Pacific Indem. Co. v. Linn, 766 F.2d 
754, 760 (3d Cir. 1985) (determination of the proper 
coverage of an insurance contract when the facts are not in 
dispute is a question of law subject to plenary review). 
 
A. 
 
Pipher's Tenant's Policy with Nationwide provides her 
with liability coverage for all "damages [she] is legally 
obligated to pay due to an occurrence." (Tenant's Policy) 
(emphasis added). The policy, in relevant part, defines 
occurrence as "bodily injury . . . resulting from: a. one 
accident." On appeal, Nationwide relies principally upon 
Gene's Restaurant, Inc. v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 548 A.2d 
246 (Pa. 1988), and a progeny of cases in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 
These cases hold that to constitute an accident, and thus 
a covered occurrence, the court must focus on the nature 
of the act which inflicted the injury or directly caused the 
death, and that act must be unintentional, even when an 
insured is sued for negligently failing to prevent or for 
contributing to the harmful intentional acts of the person 
who directly inflicted the injury or caused the death.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. E.g., Britamco Underwriters, Inc. v. George Giouzelis, Inc., No. CIV. 
A. 
93-4547, 1994 WL 622109 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 8, 1994), aff'd without opinion, 
65 F.3d 161 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1029 (1996); 
Britamco Underwriters, Inc. v. Logue's Tavern, Inc. , No. CIV. A. 95-2997, 
1995 WL 710570 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 1, 1995); Britamco Underwriters, Inc. v. 
Stone, No. CIV. A. 91-4691, 1992 WL 195378 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 1992); 
Terra Nova Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Thee Kandy Store, Inc., 679 F. Supp. 476 
(E.D. Pa. 1988); see also Britamco Underwriters, Inc. v. Grzeskiewicz, 639 
A.2d 1208 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994). But see Britamco Underwriters, Inc. v. 
Weiner, 636 A.2d 649 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (distinguishing Gene's 
Restaurant and holding that the insurer owed its insured a duty to 
defend because the plaintiff 's complaint alleged alternate theories of 
recovery (i.e., intentional and negligent conduct), which may potentially 
come within the scope of the liability insurance policy). 
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In Gene's Restaurant, the complaint merely alleged that 
while she was a patron in the defendant insured's 
restaurant, the defendant assaulted and violently beat her, 
causing injuries and damages. The complaint contained no 
allegations of negligence on the part of the insured. The 
insurer (Nationwide) refused to defend its insured against 
the complaint sounding solely in trespass which alleged 
only a willful and malicious assault and beating. The 
liability policy at issue in that case similarly defined an 
"occurrence" as an accident. Accordingly, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court summarily affirmed the Superior Court's 
holding that the insurer owed no duty to defend its insured 
based on these facts. That holding is sound, but it in no 
way dictates that an insurer owes no duty to defend its 
insured when the complaint also alleges that the assault 
was made possible by the negligence of the insured. 
 
We believe the holding in Gene's Restaurant was narrow 
and predicated on the well-established rule of insurance 
law that an insurer's duty to defend an action brought 
against its insured is to be determined solely by the 
allegations contained in the plaintiff 's pleadings. E.g., 
General Accident Ins. Co. of America v. Allen, 692 A.2d 
1089, 1094 (Pa. 1997); Gene's Restaurant, 548 A.2d at 246; 
Wilson v. Maryland Cas. Co., 105 A.2d 304, 307 (Pa. 1954). 
Because the complaint alleged solely an intentional act and 
contained no allegations of negligence on the part of its 
insured, the Gene's Restaurant court came to the 
unremarkable conclusion that an intentional tort was not 
an accident and thus not a covered occurrence under the 
policy. 
 
Nationwide contends that under Gene's Restaurant, the 
intentional murder of Bernine McFadden by Wood is not an 
occurrence (i.e., an accident) but rather an intentional tort 
which is not covered by the policy. Thus it claims that it is 
therefore relieved of its duty to defend and potentially 
indemnify Pipher, notwithstanding in this case there are 
distinct allegations of negligence that the insured's conduct 
made possible the assault and murder. Nationwide's 
argument, however, is premised on a misreading of Gene's 
Restaurant by it, by the district court in this case, and by 
the district courts in the cases cited in Nationwide's brief. 
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This has resulted in an unwarranted extension of the 
import of that case. The case against Pipher is clearly 
distinguishable from Gene's Restaurant. Here, the 
plaintiff's complaint raises numerous allegations of 
negligence on the part of Pipher, which allegedly 
contributed to Bernine McFadden's death. In this case, the 
plaintiff alleges that, among other things, Pipher 
"negligently fail[ed] to re-install the apartment doors 
necessary for the tenant's security;" "negligently failed to 
provide a reasonably safe premises for the tenants;" and 
"negligently hired Ian S. Wood to paint the second floor 
apartment." Although Bernine McFadden's death was the 
direct result of a third party's intentional conduct, the 
complaint alleges that the insured's own negligence also 
played a significant part in her death. In the absence of any 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court precedent directly on point, 
we believe that if confronted with this question, that court 
would find this distinction alone to be sufficient to hold 
that an insurance company has a duty to defend its 
insured against complaints alleging negligent conduct on 
the part of the insured as well as a third party's intentional 
conduct. See, e.g., Polselli v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Ins. 
Co., 126 F.3d 524, 528 n.3 (3d Cir. 1997) (federal courts 
sitting in diversity must predict how state high court would 
decide issue); Surace v. Caterpillar, Inc., 111 F.3d 1039, 
1044 (3d Cir. 1997) (same). 
 
B. 
 
Numerous cases support the conclusion we reach. Under 
Pennsylvania law, "the fact that the event causing [bodily 
injury or damage to property] may be traceable to an 
intentional act of a third party does not preclude the 
occurrence from being an `accident.' " Mohn v. American 
Cas. Co. of Reading, 326 A.2d 346, 348 (Pa. 1974); accord 
Wetzel v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 393 A.2d 470, 472-73 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1978) (citing Mohn with approval). In Mohn, 
the insured's son was fatally wounded by a police officer 
while attempting to flee from the scene of a burglary he was 
committing. The insured brought an action under two 
medical insurance policies for reimbursement of expenses 
he incurred as a result of his son's hospitalization. The 
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pertinent provisions of the policies obligated the insurance 
company to provide coverage "for eligible expense incurred 
as a result of injury." Id at 347. "Injury" as used in the 
policy was defined as "accidental bodily injury which 
causes the loss directly and independently of all other 
causes." Id. The trial court found that there was no 
"accidental" bodily injury when an escaping felon is shot, 
and the Superior Court affirmed. The Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court viewed the terms of the policy differently. It 
noted that "[i]n health and accident policies the law is now 
reasonably clear that the fact that the event causing the 
injury may be traceable to an intentional act of a third 
party does not preclude the occurrence from being an 
`accident.' . . . [T]he test of whether injury is a result of an 
accident is to be determined from the viewpoint of the 
insured and not from the viewpoint of the one that 
committed the act causing the injury." Id. at 348. The court 
held that the "accidental bodily injury" language of the 
policy encompassed the injuries sustained by the insured's 
son during his flight from the police. Id. at 352. 
 
As the Mohn court notes, it is well established that the 
test of whether the injury or damage is caused by an 
accident must be determined from the perspective of the 
insured and not from the viewpoint of the person who 
committed the injurious act. See, e.g., Roque v. Nationwide 
Mutual Ins. Co., 467 A.2d 1128, 1129 (Pa. 1983); Mohn, 326 
A.2d at 348; State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Martin, 660 
A.2d 66, 67 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995). From the Pipher's 
standpoint, Bernadine McFadden's assault and death was 
unexpected, entirely fortuitous, and, therefore, an accident. 
Thus, in this case, from Pipher (the insured's) perspective, 
her alleged negligence -- the failure to re-hang the doors to 
the leased apartment and the hiring of Wood, a known 
troubled person -- resulted in a tragic accident (i.e., the 
unintended and unexpected murder of her tenant Bernine 
McFadden). 
 
The rule seems to be well-settled in other jurisdictions 
that it is the intentional conduct of the insured which 
precludes coverage, not the acts of third parties. Although 
a third party may have intentionally injured or killed the 
plaintiff, the death or injury may still be deemed to be an 
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accident under the terms of the policy. See Ferdinand S. 
Tinio, Accident Insurance: Death or Injury Intentionally 
Inflicted by Another as Due to Accident or Accidental Means, 
49 A.L.R. 3d 673, 679, at S3 (1973 & 1983) (collecting 
cases from 37 states). Furthermore, there are various types 
of situations in which individuals are held to be vicariously 
liable for an intentional tort of another person. See Robert 
F. Keeton & Alan I. Widiss, Insurance Law S 5.4(d)(5) 
(student ed. 1988). Finally, many courts have expressly 
held in favor of the insured in coverage disputes involving 
the intentional conduct of third parties. See, e.g., Aetna Ins. 
Co. v. Webb, 251 So.2d 321 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971) ("it is 
reasonable to imply that the insurance company intended 
to cover losses caused by the acts, intentional or otherwise, 
of third parties"); Jones v. Doe, 673 So.2d 1163 (La. Ct. 
App. 1996) ("the intentional act exception . . . only operates 
to keep an insured from seeking indemnification for his 
own intentional acts[; t]he exception does not operate 
simply because an intentional tort has occurred; it operates 
only when an intentional tort is committed by the insured"); 
Nalea Realty Corp. v. Public Svc. Mut. Ins. Co., 656 N.Y.S.2d 
613 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (affirming award of settlement 
amount to insured landlord from liability insurer for 
damages paid in underlying suit involving intentional 
criminal act of third party (shooting tenant), and citing with 
approval Beach Haven Apts., infra); Beach Haven Apts., No. 
6, Inc. v. Allcity Ins. Co., 182 A.D.2d 658 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1992) (insurance company obligated to defend and 
indemnify the insured apartment building owner in tort suit 
for criminal rape and assault of third-party tenant which 
occurred in the building's basement); Farmers Ins. Of 
Columbus, Inc. v. Sotak, Nos. 94APE01-127, 94APE01-128, 
1994 WL 383723 (Ohio Ct. App. July 19, 1994) 
(unpublished opinion) ("when a case of insurance coverage 
is viewed from the perspective of the insured  . . . the 
consequence of a third-party's criminal agency would be 
accidental to the victim whether such harm was through an 
intentional act or criminal negligence") (emphasis added). 
 
C. 
 
Nationwide's argument, that confining our review to the 
allegations against the insured to determine whether there 
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has been an occurrence (i.e., accident) would render the 
policy's exclusion of bodily injury "expected or intended by 
the insured" redundant and meaningless, is also 
unconvincing. This exclusion, included in standard-form 
comprehensive general liability policies since the mid- 
1960s, is not simply another definition of accident. Instead, 
its express purpose is to clarify the vantage point from 
which the fortuity of the occurrence should be viewed: the 
insured's, and not that of the person who is injured or the 
insurer. See, e.g., Koppers Co., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. 
Co., 98 F.3d 1440, 1447 n.6 (3d Cir. 1996); Elitzky, 517 
A.2d at 986; Sam P. Rynearson, Exclusion of Expected or 
Intended Personal Injury or Property Damage Under the 
Occurrence Definition of the Standard Comprehensive 
General Liability Policy, 19 Forum 513, 521-23 (1984); 
James L. Rigelhaupt, Construction and Application of 
Provision of Liability Insurance Policy Expressly Excluding 
Injuries Intended or Expected by Insured, 31 A.L.R. 4th 957, 
971-72, at S2[a] (1984); cf. Hanover Ins. Co. v. Crocker, 688 
A.2d 928 (Me. 1997) ("provisions excluding from coverage 
injuries intentionally caused by `the insured' refer to a 
definite, specific insured, who is directly involved in the 
occurrence that causes the injury"). 
 
Without the exclusionary clause, it could be argued that 
an intentional injury producing act by the insured was an 
accident because the actual injury sustained by the 
plaintiff might have been unintended or unexpected or 
might even have been unintended but expected. And, 
obviously, from the standpoint of the injured party, the 
injury almost always would be accidental because it was 
unintended or expected by that party. Thus, the clause 
precludes these arguments and eliminates this ambiguity 
by clarifying that the relevant focus is upon the injury itself 
as viewed from the perspective of the insured, and not upon 
the act which produced the injury or the injury as viewed 
from the perspective injured party. Accordingly, the 
exclusionary clause applies only when the insured intends 
to cause a harm. See Elitzky, 517 A.2d at 987. 
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D. 
 
Finally, in light of the above, it is obvious that the term 
"occurrence" is ambiguous in this context and thus should 
be construed against Nationwide so as to provide coverage 
to its insured, Pipher. See, e.g., Mohn , 326 A.2d at 351 
("[W]here the contract is one of insurance any ambiguity in 
the language of the document is to be read in a light most 
strongly supporting the insured.") (citations omitted). 
Insurance companies have known for over 30 years how to 
draft a provision that excludes coverage for damages or 
injuries caused by the intentional conduct of third parties. 
See, e.g., Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Wagner, 380 
S.W.2d 224, 225 (Ky. 1964) (policy "shall not cover death or 
other loss caused or contributed to . . . by injuries 
intentionally inflicted upon the insured by any other 
person") (emphasis added); Butler v. Peninsular Life Ins. Co., 
115 So.2d 608 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (policy"shall be 
null and void if the insured's death or other loss .. . results 
directly or indirectly from . . . intentional act or acts of any 
person or persons") (emphasis added).3  Thus, if Nationwide 
intended to exclude from coverage the intentional conduct 
of third parties that is fortuitous when viewed from the 
standpoint of the insured, they apparently have known how 
to do so for many years. We conclude, therefore, that the 
term "occurrence," as used in Pipher's Tenant's Policy, 
includes bodily injury or death which is directly caused by 
the intentional act of a third party, but which is also 
attributable to the negligence of the insured. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. See also Terra Nova Ins. Co., Ltd. v. 900 Bar, Inc., 887 F.2d 1213, 
1217 (3d Cir. 1989) ("no coverage shall apply under the policy for any 
claim . . . based on assault and battery, and assault and battery shall 
not be deemed an accident, whether or not committed by or at the 
direction of the insured"); Britamco Underwriters, Inc. v. Logue's Tavern, 
No. CIV. A. 95-2997, 1995 WL 710570, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 1, 1995) (the 
insurer "is under no duty to defend or to indemnify an insured in any 
action or proceeding alleging [intentional torts] [r]egardless of degree 
of 
culpability or intent and without regard to . . .[w]hether the acts are 
alleged to be by or at the instruction or at the direction of the insured, 
his . . . employees, agents, servants; or by any other person lawfully or 
otherwise on . . . premises owned or occupied by the insured; or by any 
other person"). 
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III. 
 
In summary, we believe that the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court would hold that an occurrence, as used in a liability 
insurance policy, includes a plaintiff 's bodily injury or 
death that is the direct result of the intentional act of a 
third party when the injury or death is also attributable to 
the negligence of the insured. Thus, the court would hold 
that the insurer is obligated to defend under such policy 
and potentially indemnify its insured when the complaint 
alleges the insured's negligence. Accordingly, the district 
court's grant of summary judgment will be reversed and the 
case remanded to the district court with directions to enter 
a declaratory judgment consistent with this opinion. Costs 
taxed against the appellee. 
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ALITO, Circuit Judge, concurring. 
 
I concur in the result reached by the majority, but I write 
separately to provide a brief supplementary explanation. In 
this case, the insured, Linda Pipher, was sued for damages 
resulting from the death of Bernine McFadden. That suit 
alleged that McFadden was intentionally killed in an 
apartment that she and her husband had rented from 
Pipher; that the assailant, Ian S. Wood, was hired by Pipher 
to paint the apartment; and that McFadden's death 
resulted from Pipher's negligence. Among other things, the 
complaint asserted that Pipher was negligent in failing to 
re-install doors necessary for the safety of the tenants and 
in hiring Wood, who was allegedly known to be a drug 
abuser. App. 116. Pipher's insurance policy with 
Nationwide provides coverage for "damages the insured is 
legally obligated to pay due to an occurrence." App. 91. The 
term "occurrence" is defined as including"bodily injury or 
property damage resulting from . . .[an] accident." Id. at 84. 
The critical question in this appeal, therefore, is whether 
McFadden's death was an "accident" within the meaning of 
the policy. 
 
An "accident" is generally understood to be an event that 
is "unintentionally caused." Random House Dictionary of the 
English Language 9 (1967). Here, the complaint in the tort 
suit against Pipher did not allege that Wood 
"unintentionally caused" McFadden's death; on the 
contrary, that complaint alleged that he intentionally killed 
her. At the same time, however, that complaint, by alleging 
that Pipher's acts of negligence proximately caused Bernine 
McFadden's death, did in essence allege that Pipher 
"unintentionally caused" her death. Therefore, according to 
the complaint, McFadden's death was not an accident from 
Wood's perspective but was an accident from Pipher's 
perspective. 
 
Under Pennsylvania law, if a term in an insurance policy 
is ambiguous "and if the insurer wrote the policy or is in a 
stronger bargaining position than the insured, the 
ambiguity is generally resolved in favor of the insured and 
against the insurer." Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. Aetna 
Cas. & Sur. Co., 632 F.2d 1068, 1075 (3d Cir. 1980). Here, 
the policy provision providing coverage for damages 
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resulting from an "accident" is ambiguous because the 
provision does not specify the perspective from which the 
accidental or non-accidental nature of the result is to be 
judged. Therefore, if I were free to exercise my independent 
judgment as to how the policy provision should be 
interpreted in light of the Pennsylvania rule that 
ambiguities in insurance policies should generally be 
construed against the insurer, I would hold that the 
damages sought in the tort suit against Pipher resulted 
from an "accident" as that term is used in her policy. 
 
Because this is a diversity action, however, we are not 
free to exercise our independent judgment but must instead 
predict how the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would rule. 
The district court in this case viewed Gene's Restaurant, 
Inc. v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 548 A.2d 246 (Pa. 1988), as 
controlling, but I believe that that interpretation is probably 
erroneous. In Gene's Restaurant, Patricia Aschenback and 
her husband sued the restaurant, alleging that a 
restaurant employee, acting within the scope of his 
employment, had committed an assault and battery upon 
her and that the restaurant was liable for her resulting 
injuries.1 The restaurant's insurance policy contained 
language similar to that in the policy at issue in this case. 
Holding, in a tersely worded opinion, that the insurer was 
not obligated to defend the suit against the restaurant, the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania wrote: 
 
       The willful and malicious assault alleged in the 
       complaint is not an accident but rather is an 
       intentional tort. As such, it is not covered by the policy 
       and, therefore, the insurer owed no duty to defend. 
 
548 A.2d at 247. 
 
It seems best to interpret the decision in Gene's 
Restaurant as taking the view that, according to the 
allegations in the Aschenbacks' complaint, the restaurant, 
acting through its employee, did not accidentally cause 
Patricia Aschenback's injuries but rather intentionally 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. See Gene's Restaurant Inc. v. Nationwide Insurance Co., 95 E.D. 
Appeal Docket 1987, Record at 14a, PP3 & 4 (reproducing plaintiff 's 
Complaint in Trespass). 
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caused them by committing an assault and battery. Thus, 
Gene's Restaurant, contrary to the majority's 
understanding, is not a case in which an insured was sued 
for damages resulting from a third party's intentional acts. 
Instead, Gene's Restaurant is a case in which an insured 
was sued for damages resulting from what were, in legal 
effect, its own intentional acts. Interpreted in this way, 
Gene's Restaurant does not decide the question presented 
in this appeal. 
 
By contrast, the Superior Court's decision in Britamco 
Underwriters, Inc. v. Grzeskiewicz, 639 A.2d 1208 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1994), involved a situation materially 
indistinguishable from the one presented here. Donna Lee 
Smith sued Dagwood's Pub and its proprietors, alleging 
that another pub patron, William Hopania, had "violently 
attacked Smith with a broken beer bottle, striking her in 
the face." 639 A.2d at 1209. "Smith's complaint also 
asserted that her injuries were caused by Dagwood's Pub's 
carelessness, recklessness, negligence and/or gross and 
wanton disregard." Id. Holding that Smith's complaint did 
not seek to recover for an "accident" within the meaning of 
the pub's insurance policy, the Superior Court wrote: 
 
       Smith avers that "the injuries and damages she 
       sustained . . . occurred as [a result of] the intentional, 
       willful and purposeful acts of William Hopania." Smith 
       does not allege that the incident in question amounted 
       to an "accident," nor does she claim that her injuries 
       were incurred as a result of any negligence by Hopania. 
       In light of these allegations and the Supreme Court's 
       decision in Gene's Restaurant, . . . wefind that Smith's 
       claims against Dagwood's Pub arising out of Hopania's 
       assault, do not constitute an "occurrence" as defined 
       by the instant policy. 
 
Id. at 1210-11. 
 
If we followed this decision, we would be compelled to 
affirm here, and in diversity cases we are instructed to heed 
the decisions of a state's intermediate appellate court 
unless we are convinced by "other persuasive data" that the 
state's highest court would reach a different result. West v. 
American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 311 U.S. 243 (1940). 
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But although the question is debatable, I conclude in the 
end that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would not 
follow the Superior Court's holding. For the reasons already 
explained, I do not think that the state supreme court 
would view Gene's Restaurant as dispositive, and I believe 
that the state supreme court would find the term"accident" 
as used in the policy to be ambiguous and would thus 
construe it against the insurer. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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